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The  Member  States must  go  beyond  the stage of inter-governmental  cooperation,  which  has 
proved its ineffectiveness,  and  set up  for the aircraft industr,y a  true common  policy and 
provide the European  Community  with the means  to implement it, both at industrial and 
commercial  level and in terms  of air transport. 
The  proposals  from  the European  Commission  (based on  a  stu~ of the situation in the 
aircraft sector,  summarized  in the annex)  define what  a  future  common  European aircraft 
policy should look like and set out a  development  programme  for it, taking account  of market 
realities. 
1.  The  market  for the European aircraft industry 
Although evident, it is all too often forgotten that the European aircraft industry cannot 
base its future  only on  its ability to satisf,y users'  needs.  Moreover,  it cannot hope  to 
penetrate export markets  {which are essential to it) unless it occupies an important  place 
on  its own  market.  Finally,  since this is an industry which  serves both the military and 
civil markets,  and  since the military market  takes over 6o%  of its production,  an aircraft 
policy which  confined itself to the civil market  and  excluded the military market would be 
quite pointless. 
(a)  The  civil market 
The  adoption of a  European aircraft policy presupposes the existence of a  genuine European 
market  and,  therefore,  the implementation of a  common  air transport policy.  This does not 
exist;  instead there are rigidly demarcated national markets in which  access to air traffic 
is mainly allocated on  the basis of the air transport  companies  1  nationality.  In the 
opinion of the European  Commission,  a  common  air transport policy should pursue the 
following general  aims: 
•  the creation of a  European airspace,  to be managed  on  a  Community  basis and  involving the 
establishment in respect  of intra-Community traffic of a  system  of regulated competition, 
whose  aim  will be to provide the public with services better tailored to its needs,  at 
the best prices possible,  through the introduction of new  services and  the diversification 
of existing services and the rationalization of route networks,  particularly in inter-
regional traffic; 
•  joint negotiation of agreements with non-member  countries,  particularly as regards landing 
rights, with the twofold result of strengthening the European Community's  negotiating 
power  ~d optimizing international routes and  services. Industry and  Society - No  34/75 - 7,10,1975 - P•  3 
A common  air transport policy of this kind would  enable the air carriers to play their part, 
together.  in defining European aircraft construction programmes,  They  would  act as a 
necessar,y and valid talking partner for industr,y and  could well  propose programmes  with a 
view to increased competitiveness  on  world markets, 
(b)  The  military market 
The  wide  variety of aircraft types and  equipment  used by the European air forces is a  heayr 
burden on  public finance,  Though  the short-term interests of American arms  suppliers m~ 
benefit from  the divisions of Europe,  which  have  enabled them  to win  contracts like that 
for the F 16  which  has been bought by four European  countries,  the Americans'  long-term 
interests, like those of Europe,  lie in the establishment of a  coherent European weapons' 
procurement  system which will  enable European  industry to make  a  more  economic  contribution 
to the joint defence effort. 
The  Commission  is therefore requesting the Governments  of the Community  Member  States to 
decide to create a  joint military aircraft procurement  agency responsible for joint 
development  and  procurement  of weapons  systems  to meet  the needs  of the European armed 
forces.  Initially it could be an ad hoc  body working in liaison with the relevant national 
ministries and in close cooperation with the Commission.  The  agency would  become  an organ 
of European Union  once this takes shape. 
The  agency  should,  in particular: 
,  coordinate the requirements  of European air forces to ensure systematic and  standardized 
use of existing European military aircraft for similar missions; 
,  identify common  future requirements necessitating new  joint development  programmes, 
A European policy for the procurement  of airborne weapons  systems would  have  to be 
accompanied by discussions with the United States to obtain a  mutual  opening-up  of markets 
on  both sides of the Atlantic and  ensure that EUrope's  role is preserved in all major sectors 
of technology. 
2. A European programme  for civil transport aircraft 
The  analysis made  by the Commission  in collaboration with the European Aerospace 
Manufacturers Association  (AECMA)  led to the following three conclusions: 
(a)  The  need to maintain a  European  prese~ce in the sector of short and medium  haul aircraft 
of less than 100  seats,  This requires further support for existing programmes  and 
guarantees for their future development  in order to maintain and  even  increase their 
alTeady excellent penetration on  the world market  and  to counter the competition which 
is likely to result from  new  American projects in this sector. IndustbY and Society - No  34/75 - 1.10.1975 - P•  4 
(b)  The  need for  joint  stu~y of the various solutions which will  enable the European 
indust;y to occupy a  major position in the market  for other short and medium  haul 
aircraft.  The  choice is difficult and in the sector of two-engined aircraft of 
140-150 seats European industry has  three projects for developing existing aircraft 
(Mercure,  BAC  111  and Trident).  There is also the problem of Italian cooperation with 
Boeing for a  three-engined aircraft of 200  seats (the Boeing'-Aeri talia 7:r.7)  which  may 
well  compete  with the B 10 reduced capacity version of the European Airbus. 
(c) Finally,  care must be taken to widen  the opportunities for a  European initiative in the 
field of long haul aircraft.  The  only current European project is Concorde;  however, 
its prospects are difficult to assess until it actually comes  into service.  The 
problem at present,  which requires a  joint European  answer,  is whether to launch a  new 
programme  for a  200-seat fanr-engined aircraft to replace the 707  and  DC  8.  Here  again 
the Airbus  seems  capable of providing the most  probable basis for study with its B 11 
version. 
If it is to succeed,  such a  European civil transport aircraft construction programme  must 
comply with a  number  of jointly determined principles.  It must  form  part of a  coherent 
European aircraft programme.  Such  a  policy is what  the European Commission is asking the 
Council  of the European Communities  to adopt. 
3. A common  policy for the aircraft industr;y 
If the Community's  aircraft industry is to have  a:ny  future,  we  must  go  beyond the stage of 
intergovernmental  cooperation between differing,  and still national,  aerospace policies. 
To  this end,  sponsorship of the aircraft indust;r should be exercised by the European 
Community. 
The  eventual  framework  for the management  of the Community's  policy for the aircraft industry 
should be that to which  the Community  is already accustomed:  namely that,  acting on  a 
proposal  from  the European Commission,  after consulting the European Parliament,  the Council 
of the Community  would  make  the major policy decisions  on  programmes,  Community  financing 
and  international agreement  in this sector.  On  the basis of these decisions,  the Commission 
would  assume  the necessary management  of the  common  aerospace policy,  and would  take the 
necessary steps to consult users,  producers,  trade unions and  national authorities. 
The  Commission  would  organize the management  of the aircraft policy in such a  way  as to use 
to the maximum  existing national structures and  to seek the greatest possible 
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Community  financing of the aircraft policy would  not be superimposed  on  national  financing 
but would  replace it as the policy is implemented. 
This policy would  include,  in particular: 
•  bringing all large civil transport aircraft construction activities of the Community 
countries into a  coherent programme  and  optimizing the use of resources; 
•  close cooperation between industr.y,  airlines and  public authorities about  the decisions 
required in executing the  joint programme; 
•  a  joint basic research programme; 
•  the establishment of a  system of Community  financing; 
•  conduct  of relations with non-member  countries:  not  only collaboration between Community 
industries and  those of other countries, but also a  commercial  strategy for penetrating 
export markets; 
•  harmonization of laws  or administrative provisions regarding certificates of airworthiness, 
noise and other nuisances and  standardization generally. 
Such  a  programme  should also promote  a  permanent  industrial structure, at least for large 
civil aircraft, particularly in sales and after-sales service, based on  experience in 
cooperation so far;  this would  enable the European aircraft industr.y to increase 
productivity and reap the full benefit of rationalization. 
The  first decision which  the Council is asked to take on  the basis of the Commission's 
proposals concerns the adoption of the principle of a  European programme  backed by joint 
financing.  This European programme  should be prepared together with the manufacturers and 
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THE  SI'IUATION  IN  THE  AIRCRAFT  INDUSTRY  • 
1. Reasons  for the current problems  in this sector 
'· 
All  the most  recent civil developments  (Concorde,  Airbus,  Fokker-VFW  614,  F  28,  Mercure) 
have  involved European collaboration in one  form  or another.  Yet  in the area of intra-
Community  cooperation limitations have been felt.  Programmes  carried out in cooperation 
on  a bilateral or a  trilateral basis have not  formed  part of a  single and  coherent 
framework.  Moreover,  cooperation has mainly been in the development  phase or in series 
manufacture rather than in marketing.  As  a  result of this fragmentation of efforts, 
programmes  have  generally been oriented towards  technological rather than marketing 
objectives.  Because they have wanted to maintain commercial  competitivity and militar.y 
independence,  the manufacturers have  often decided to retain their own  research programmes, 
to develop the same  expertise and to create,  with the backing of the governmental 
authorities,  the same  research infrastructure. 
During the 1960s  two  major opportunities were  lost: 
The  first was  in the civil aircraft field:  the Airbus,  the only major modern  technology 
project in Europe  in the market  for medium  haul aircraft, was  launched without the 
participation of the British Government  and with an American  engine,  even  though Hawker 
Siddeley provided industrial participation;  at the same  time,  the largest EUropean  engine 
manufacturer,  Rolls Royce,  supplied the RB  211  engine for the Lockheed  Tristar.  Thus  a 
severe conflict of political and  commercial  interests divided the European industry,  Airbus 
with its American  CF  6  engine and  Tristar with its European RB  211  engine  competing 
throughout  the world market,  including that of British Airw~s itself. 
The  second was  in the milita;r field,  in the parallel major divergence of interests created 
by the absence of France from  the MRCA  projects. 
2.  The  importance of the aircraft industry 
In 1973  the Community's  turnover aerospace was  5 990 million units of account,  that of the 
United States 16  368 million (1  u.a. = approx.  US  ¢1.30). 
From  1969  to 1973  the turnover of the European industry rose annually by an average of 6.6%; 
over the same  period United States turnover fell by.27%.  While  in 1969  European  turnover 
was  16%  of that of the United States,  the figure reached  29%  in 1973.  The  importance  of 
military sales is shown  by the fact that they represent 62.6%  of the total turnover of the IndustrY and  Society - No  34/75  - 1.10.1975 - Annex  - P•  2 
Community  aerospace sector as against 70.2%  in the United States.  The  improvement  in 
European turnover figures is due  to milita;y sales,  to government  contracts for research 
and development  and to the sales of spares and  equipment  for civil aircraft alreagy in 
service for ma.n.y  years,  as well as of engines.  So  far it has not been due  to substantial 
sales of new  civil aircraft. 
The  breakdown  of aerospace turnover by main  categories of customer gives 58.3%  for the 
State, 11.4%  for the internal civil market  and 30.3%  for export;  the corresponding figures 
for the United States are 51.5%,  20.9%  and  27.6%. 
The  State is therefore an important  customer for the European aircraft industry.  It should 
be noted,  however,  that in the Community,  governments  intervene in the civil and military 
sectors by purchases and  R&D  contracts,  whereas in the USA  the Federal Government  intervenes 
primarily by means  of military purchases and military R&D  contracts. 
In 1973,  the aerospace sector in the Community  employed 406  605  people,  whereas  in 1969  this 
figure was  435  553.  This fall in the workforce of approximately 7%  is primarily due  to a 
reduction in numbers  employed within the British industry and  overall reflects an improvement 
in productivity.  During this period,  the number  of jobs in aerospace activities dropped in 
the USA  by 32.3%  and in Canada.  by 31.9%,  but rose in Japan by 12.6%. 
Productivity expressed in terms  of added value or turnover per head  employed  in the 
European industry averages half that of the American industry. 
3.  The  aircraft industry's activities and programmes 
The  table below of numbers  of jets built shows: 
•  on  the one  hand the length of the production runs of the American aircraft and their 
in-service life; 
•  on  the other hand,  the large number  of programmes  launched by the European industry, 
sometimes  in competition with each  other and always  with production runs which  even under 
the best assumptions  only just enable amortization of costs to be achieved. Indust;r and  Society - No  34/75 - 7.10.1975 - Annex  - P•  3 
American Jet Aircraft 
Boeing 720  and 707  897 
Boeing 727  1  195 
Boeing 747  283 
Boeing 737  407 
DC8  (556) 
DC  9  802 
DC  10  240 
Tristar  150 
Convair  (83) 
Total  4  613 
In brackets:  aircraft out  of production. 
EUropean Jet Aircraft 
Caravelle 
BAC  111 
HS  Trident 
vc  10 
Comet 
Mercure 
Concorde 
Airbus A 300 
F  28 
VFW  614 
Total 
(278) 
219 
117 
(47) 
(51) 
(10) 
9 
23 
95 
10 
859 
There is also American  superiority in respect  of other types  of aircraft.  In the field of 
general aviation,  in 1973  approximately 14  000  aircraft were  produced in the USA  compared  to 
1  200  aircraft produced in Europe  (of which  350  were  produced by the French subsidiar,y of an 
American  camp~).  In the field of commercial  turboprop aircraft,  the EUropean 
manufacturers have  experienced considerable success,  notably with the Fokker F  27  and  the 
Hawker  Siddeley 748. 
The  European  industry has  shown  a  remarkable degree of competitiveness and  dynamism  in the 
field of executive  jets (about 730 aircraft have been produced to date in EUrope  against 
1  300 in the USA).  There is a  similar situation in the field of helicopters. 
European industry has  produced competitive engines,  although the increasing cost of 
development  has led the principal European manufacturers to create cooperative links with 
the two  major manufacturers in the USA  for the new  10 ton engines. 
The  milita;y field has  seen the development  of a  series of collaborative European projects. 
Yet  in the 1960s Europe  did not adopt  a  joint policy and  consequently in the key area of 
advanced  combat  aircraft,  Europe  is still engaged in ru.inous  competition.  When  the time 
came  to consider the development  of a  joint European  successor to the existing generation of 
jet combat  aircraft, negotiations between the UK  and France on  a  possible Anglo-French 
Variable-Geometry aircraft broke down.  The  UK,  West  Germany  and Italy then combined  to 
develop the MRCA,  which,  with production orders of some  800  aircraft, is Europe's majo7· 
current  joint military project.  The  absence  of the French from  the MRCA  caused a  fundamental IndustrY and Society - No  34/75 - 1.10.1975 - Annex  - P•  4 
divergence of interests within Europe.  The  absence of a  solidarity of interests has been 
reflected in other areas:  the development  of two  separate trainer aircraft  (the 
Dassault-Dornier Alphajet and the Hawker  Siddeley Hawk)  and the fact that the jointly 
developed Anglo-French Jaguar  (BAC  and Dassault-Breguet) has  found itself in competition 
with Dassault's  own  F 1. 
When  the time  came  in 1975  for Belgium,  the Netherlands,  Denmark  and  Norway  to decide  on  a 
replacement  for their F 104s,  the choice of an American aircraft was,  quite apart from  all 
technical and  operational  considerations,  a  logical  consequence  of these divisions of 
interest.  Through  the absence  of a  systematic European procurement  policy,  a  significant 
market  opportunity for European aircraft now  and  in the future has been lost. 
4.  The  market  for civil transport aircraft 
The  general  trend has been the increased size of the Community  market at the expense  of 
that of the USA.  Between 1970 and  1973  the share of the European market  increased from 
14.7% to 18.2%  of the Western market,  while that of the USA  fell  from  63.9%  to 53%.  Between 
1973  and 1975  the share of the market  filled by the Rest of the World  has  continued to 
expand  rapidly;  that of the USA  has  shrunk to 45.8%  while that of the Community  has 
stabilized at 17.6%. 
European production has benefited from  this general  trend which  should in theory have been 
favourable to manufacturers  outside the USA.  In fact the percentages for the share of 
European products on  the various markets fell substantially between 1970 and  1975  as  shown 
in the table below: 
1970  1975  Change 
Community  33.0'fo  21.9%  - 11.1 
Other Western  European  countries  23.1%  5.8%  - 17.3 
Europe  30.1%  16.9%  - 13.2 
USA  2.1%  0.3%  - 1.8 
Rest  of the World  12.2%  12.CYfo  - 0.2 
Western World  9.5%  7-9%  - 1.6 Indust;y and Society - No  34/75  - 1.10.1975 - Annex  - P•  5 
The  net result of the growth in the European air transport market  and  the reduction in the 
share of all the markets held by the European manufacturing industry has been a  negative 
trade balance over the period 1968-73,  amounting to ~  4  521  million in 1974  (~ 2 695  for 
long haul aircraft and  ~  1  826  million for short and medium  haul aircraft). 
Estimates of the value of the Western civil transport aircraft market  for 1975-85  show  that 
the USA  will account  for about  one  third,  the Rest  of the World  for 4o%  and Europe  for one 
quarter. 
The  supply capacity of the European industry will  obviously depend  on  political and 
commercial  decisions taken in respect of aircraft programmes.  Various hypotheses have been 
put  forward:  all indicate that the European balance of trade will be negative and,  in the 
most  pessimistic hypothesis,  this negative balance m~  well  exceed 5 thousand million 
dollars. 
5.  The  potential  of the aeronautics sector 
The  current  operation of the European aircraft sector shows  that considerable potential 
exists which  could be made  use of.  It is incontestable,  firstly,  that an overall  judgment 
on  the state of the Community  aerospace sector cannot be a  negative one.  Activity in this 
sector is constantly expanding  (even when  calculated at constant prices and  exchange rates), 
the level of technology is excellent and the level of knowhow  and  design capability is 
certainly not inferior to that of American industry.  It can therefore be said that the 
technological infrastructure and the human  and  even  financial  resources  (taking into 
account  the funds  devoted to this sector) are sufficient for the European industry to regain 
an important role on  the world market,  provided that an effort is made  towards 
rationalization of which it is certainly capable. 
Moreover,  market  forecasts  exhibit a  trend which  can be of great importance for the fUture 
of the European industry:  growth  of the European market,  growth of the market  in the Rest  of 
the World,  and fall in the American market.  If one  considers the scale,  in value terms of 
the world market  as forecast for the next ten years,  this trend opens  sufficient market 
prospects for a  satisfactory development  for the industry to be mapped  out. 
Finally,  the structure of the world industry favours  a  major effort to maintain activity by 
the manufacturing industry in Europe.  Already in the market  for civil transport aircraft 
the USA  is left with only three large manufacturers,  and  of these a  single company,  Boeing, 
holds 72%  of the world market  for long haul aircraft and 49%  of the market  for short and 
medium  haul aircraft.  Moreover,  the pressure towards  even greater concentration remains 
strong within American  industry.  The  best guarantee,  ensuring that European users will be 
able to make  their purchases in competitive conditions,  would be the existence of a  viable 
European industry capable of developing cooperative ventures with other industries such as 
those of Japan and the USA  on  a  basis which is not  one  of dependence. 